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Bringing Dark Money Into the Light:
501(c)(4) Organizations, Gift Tax, and
Disclosure
Tyler J. Kassner*
Political speech funneled through 501(c) (4) organizations and
funded by anonymous contributions is not just legal: It's rampant.
Could applying the gift tax to 501(c) (4) contributions resolve a legal
grey area while curbing this anonymous political speech?
Legally, expanding the gift tax would appear to be a legitimate
option. It would be consistent with prior tax expansions and it is not
abnormal for tax incentives to influence taxpayer behavior. The
problem is not whether Congress could expand the tax, but whether it
should. Applying the gift tax to 501(c) (4) contributions may very well
curtail anonymous spending by c4s, but it would also hurt legitimate
c4s and would not be likely to reduce the scale of anonymous
contributions. Instead of using the gift tax as a blunt instrument that is
unlikely to fix the problem, Congress should instead focus on
mandating disclosure for any organization that engages in political
speech.
I. INTRODUCTION
The 2012 Presidential campaign saw unprecedented levels of
political spending by corporations and wealthy individual donors.'
What is perhaps more worrying than the sheer volume of private
money is how much of that money came from donations made
without public disclosure. 2 The media began referring to these

* J.D. Candidate May 2014, University of California Hastings College of the Law.
Thanks to Stephen Schwarz for his notes on an earlier draft and Yvonne B. Ransom for
her support.
1. John Hudson, The Most Expensive Election in History by the Numbers, THE ATLANTIC
WIRE (Nov. 6, 2012), http://www.theatlanticwire.com/politics/2012/11/most-expensive-electionhistory-numbers/58745/.
2. Id.
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contributions as "dark money."3 The most significant sources of these
anonymous political contributions were 501(c)(4) organizations.4
These organizations only recently come into the public view' when
the IRS admitted to using inappropriate criteria to identify which
organizations would the subject of an IRS audit, 6 but spending by
501(c)(4) organizations has been anything but insubstantial.7
Crossroads GPS, a 501(c)(4) organization run by Karl Rove, claimed
it alone planned to spend more than $100 million on politics in 2012,
with approximately half of that spent on independent expenditures.'
This amount is substantial even compared to the largest Super PACthe pro-Romney Restore Our Future, Inc., spent just over $146.6
million in 2012.9
The most alarming aspect of the amount of 501(c)(4) spending is
that, unlike Super PACs, who must disclose their donors, individuals
can essentially contribute to 501(c)(4)s anonymously. 0 The recent
explosion in 501(c)(4) use for political purposes had piqued the
interest of certain politicians and members of the media even before
the IRS incident. Senator Michael Bennet referred to 501(c)(4)
organizations that make independent expenditures as "Super PACs
masquerading as nonprofit charities" and stated that voters should

3. Hudson, supra note 1.
4. Editorial Board, Hidden Campaign Cash, WASH. POST (Dec. 5, 2012), http://articles.
washingtonpost.com/2012-12-05/opinions/35638520_1 crossroads-gps-political-activity-political-ads.
5. The significance of 501(c)(6) organizations was not common knowledge at the time this
article was written. The extent of 501(c)(6) political activity reinforces the need for reform as
(c)(6) organizations allow anonymous contributions similar to (c)(4)s but some contributions
may actually qualify as trade or business expenses and be deducted. The IRS has addressed this
in proposed regulations; see also Nicholas Confessore, Tax Filings Hint at Extent of Koch
Brothers' Reach, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/13/us/politics/
tax-filings-hint-at-extent-of-koch-brothers-reach.html?_r=0 (indicating that 501(c)(6) organization
headed by the Koch brothers contributed $236 million to conservative organizations prior to the
2012 election); see also IRS.gov, Tax treatment of donations -501(c)(6) organizations.
6. Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration, InappropriateCriteria Were Used
to Identify Tax-Exempt Applications for Review (May 14, 2013), available at http://www.treas
ury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2013reports/201310053fr.pdf.
7. Center for Responsive Politics, 2012 Outside Spending, by Group, available at http://
www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2012&chrt=V&disp=0&type=U.
8. Andrew Rosenthal, 501(c) Mischief, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2012), http://takingnote.
blogs.nytimes.com/2012/06/27/501 c-mischief/.
9. IRS.gov, IRS statement on applicability of gift tax on 501(c)(4) organization contributions, availableat http://images.nictusa.com/pdf/543/13961079543/13961079543.pdf.
10. B. HOLLY SCHADLER, THE CONNECTION: STRATEGIES FOR CREATING AND OPERATING
501 (C)(3)s, 501 (c)(4)S AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS, 3 (3rd ed. 2012); see also Emma Schwarz,
The Rules That Govern 501(c)(4)s, PBS.org (Oct. 30, 2012), available at http://www.pbs.org
/wgbh/pages/frontline/govemment-elections-politics/big-sky-big-money/the-rules-thatgovern-501c4s/.
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know who is behind the shadowy attack ads they produce." The IRS
initially expressed interest in determining whether the gift tax applies
to 501(c)(4) donations, but has since stated it has no immediate plans
to examine contributions to 501(c)(4)s pending additional guidance or
legislation.12 Even though the IRS will not apply gift tax to 501(c)(4)
contributions, it does not allow (501(c)(4) organizations to run
rampant. The New York Times reported the IRS has recently begun
subjecting new organizations that apply for 501(c)(4) status to
rigorous questionnaires demanding to know their political leanings
and the extent of their political activities.
The extent to which
applying the gift tax to 501(c)(4) contributions would affect
anonymous political contributions is unknown.
Anonymity in political contributions is valuable to donors for a
variety of reasons. Anyone who relies on broad public appeal would
do well to avoid potentially alienating a large subset of the population
by taking a side on a controversial issue. The recent uproar over
Chick-fil-A is a prime example of how a divisive political belief can
impact public opinion.14 Even individuals who are not public figures
may wish to keep their political beliefs private for personal or
business reasons. One of the primary arguments against disclosure is
that this desire to keep beliefs private reduces political contributions
and therefore political speech. Although it is clear why anonymous
contributions are appealing to donors, the interests of maintaining an
informed electorate and deterring and exposing campaign finance
abuses outweigh this interest."
Although applying the gift tax to 501(c)(4) contributions may
decrease anonymous political spending, it is not the most direct or
effective method of accomplishing this goal. There are alternative
methods of obfuscating the source of political contributions, such as
the use of a Limited Liability Company.'" Individuals can also skirt
the gift tax by giving to a greater number of 501(c)(4) organizations
11. Jonathan Weisman, Scrutiny of Political Nonprofits Sets Off Claim of Harassment, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 6, 2012), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/07/us/politics/irs-scrutiny-ofpolitical-groups-stirs-harassment-claim.html?_r=1 &.
12. IRS.gov, IRS statement on applicability of gift tax on 501(c)(4) organization
contributions (Aug. 4, 2012), available at http://www.irs.gov/uacllRS-statement-on-applicabilityof-gift-tax-on-50128c2928429-organization-contributions.
13. Weisman, supra note 11.
14. SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 696 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
15. Nicholas Confessore & Michael Luo, Secrecy Shrouds 'Super PAC' Funds in Latest
Filings, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/02/us/politics/super-pacfilings-show-power-and-secrecy.html?pagewanted=all.
16. SCHADLER, supra note 10, at 18.
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with similar goals. Instead of aiming the gift tax at 501(c)(4)'s,
Congress should seek a more precise solution via legislation: Require
all organizations that make political contributions to disclose the
source of the contributions.
II. RECENT POLITICAL SPENDING AND
DISCLOSURE CASES
Prior to Citizens United, few corporations were able to advocate
expressly to anyone besides bona fide members." The Citizens
United decision led to a fundamental shift in U.S. campaign finance.
Shortly after Citizens United, SpeechNow.org v. Federal Election

Commission established the basis for Super PACs." These two cases
have been largely responsible for the recent changes in political
spending.
A.

CITIZENS UNITED V. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

In Citizens United the Supreme Court held that the First
Amendment prevents the government from restricting the ability of
corporations or unions to make independent expenditures, but the
government may regulate speech by requiring disclaimers and
disclosure.19 An independent expenditure, as defined by the FECA,
is a communication that expressly advocates for the election or defeat
of a federal political candidate but is not coordinated with a political
party or individual candidate. 20 The Court relied heavily on Buckley
in its decision. 2 1 In Citizens United, the Court held the only time free
speech may be limited is to avoid the appearance of corruption. 22
Instead of using the more expansive McConnell definition of
corruption, the Court limited the definition to quid pro quo.23
Following this decision, corporations and unions were provided with
the ability to spend an unlimited amount on independent political
expenditures, but they cannot contribute directly, or in kind, to
federal candidates, federal PACs, or federal parties. 24
17. SCHADLER, supra note 10, at 5.

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 885 (2010).
2 U.S.C. § 431 (2002).
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876; see generally Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 884.
Id. at 901.
SCHADLER, supra note 10, at 18.
SpeechNow.org, 599 F.3d at 427.
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SPEECHNOW.ORG v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

The issue in SpeechNow.org v. Federal Election Commission was
whether the continuous reporting requirements set forth in the Federal
Election Campaign Act ("FECA") violated the Constitution's First
Amendment rights to freedom of speech and freedom of assembly. 25
SpeachNow.org was an unincorporated organization that wished to
engage in express advocacy through independent expenditures.26 The
Federal Election Commission ("FEC") issued a draft advisory opinion
that found SpeechNow.org to be a political committee; SpeechNow.org
was therefore required to comply with the reporting requirements of the
FECA.27
The SpeechNow.org court held that the First Amendment
prevented FECA limits on contributions made by individuals to political
organizations that perform only independent expenditures?2 The court
relied heavily on Citizens United when making its determination as to
the constitutionality of limiting contributions by individuals to
organization that perform only independent expenditures. 29 It found
that unlimited contributions by individuals did not qualify for exemption
under the newly liberalized test for "appearance of corruption." 0 This
decision led directly to the formation of federal PACs that only make
independent expenditures (i.e., Super PACs).3 1
Unlike limits on independent expenditures, disclosure
requirements do not prevent anyone from speaking. Therefore,
disclosure requirements are held to a lower standard: "The
government may point to any governmental interest that bears a
'substantial relation' to the disclosure requirement."3 2
The
SpeechNow.org court held that the FECA disclosure requirements
were constitutional because the public's interest in knowing who is
funding speech about a candidate and the deterrence and exposure of
campaign finance restrictions outweighs the First Amendment
rights.33
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 436.
SpeechNow.org, 599 F.3d at 436.
Id. at 430.
SCHADLER, supra note 10, at 18.
SpeechNow.org, 599 F.3d at 434 (quoting Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 914).
Id. at 696.
26 U.S.C. § 501 (2010).
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III. POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS BY 501(C)(4)
ORGANIZATIONS, SUPER PACS, AND LLCs
501(c)(4) organizations, Super PACs, and LLCs all have the
ability to make some form of political contribution. There are,
however, differences in the types, amounts, and disclosure
requirements associated with the contributions. These differences
affect the utility of how each are used.
A. 501 (C)(4)
501(c)(4) organizations are described by the Internal Revenue
Code as organizations not organized for profit, and operated
exclusively for the promotion of social welfare.3 4 The income of 11
organizations listed in 501(c) is generally exempt from taxation. 5 A
501(c)(4) organization may be formed as either an independent
organization or by an associated 501(c)(3).3 6 The two associated
organizations may have many of the same officers and members, but
the funding for each must be distinct.37 501(c)(4) organizations
formed by 501(c)(3) organizations tend to be used to do the lobbying
or political activities the 501(c)(3) is unable to do itself.38
Independent 501(c)(4)s are generally organizations concerned with
public welfare, but are disqualified from being 501(c)(3)s due to their
purpose, the extent of their lobbying, or their desire to engage in
political activities. 39
501(c)(4)s differ from 501(c)(3)s in a number of important ways.
501(c)(3)s must be operated exclusively for religious, charitable, or
scientific purposes0 while 501(c)(4)s must only have a stated primary
purpose that benefits a broad group of people. 4 1 Substantial limits have
26 U.S.C. § 501 (2010).
SCHADLER, supra note 10, at 11.
Id.
SCHADLER, supra note 10, at 11.
Barbara K. Rhomberg, THE LAw REMAINS UNSETTLED ON Gwr TAXATION OF
SECTION 501(c)(4) CONTRIBUTIONS, Taxation of Exempts 65 (September/October 2003).
39. The full list also includes testing for public safety, literary or educational purposes, or to
foster national or international amateur sports competition (but only if no part of its activities
involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to
children or animals; 26 U.S.C. § 501 (2010).
40. 26 U.S.C. § 501 (2010).
41. The limitation on 501(c)(3) lobbying is provided by the sliding scale formula in 501(h);
26 U.S.C. § 501 (2010).
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
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been placed on a 501(c)(3)'s ability to their lobby.4 2 However,
501(c)(4)s may conduct an unlimited amount of lobbying. 43 Donations
to 501(c)(3)s are deductible by the donors44 while donations to
501(c)(4)s are not.4 5 Essentially, A 501(c)(4) trades a donor's ability to
deduct their donations for the donor's ability to attempt to influence
legislation.
A 501(c)(4)'s stated primary purpose must be for the promotion
of social welfare.4 6 This requirement is satisfied if it is primarily
engaged in promoting the common good and social welfare of a
community as a whole. 47 The stated primary purpose of a 501(c)(4)
must benefit the general public as a whole rather than a small or
select group of citizens. 48 A 501(c)(4) may not have as its primary
purpose the participation in or intervention in political campaigns on
behalf of any candidate for public office. 49
The primary advantages of a 501(c)(4) over a 501(c)(3) are its
abilities to conduct an unlimited amount of lobbying and to make
Although Citizens United allows all
independent expenditures.
organizations to make independent expenditures,50 section 501(h) of
the tax code explicitly limits a 501(c)(3)'s lobbying" and 501(c)(3)
itself prohibits intervening in any political campaign on behalf of any
A 501(c)(4)'s ability to make
candidate for public office.52
independent expenditures are restricted by both section 527(f)
Initially, these
taxation 3 and the "primary purpose" test. 54
restrictions serve to make 501(c)(4)s appear less attractive than Super
PACs as vehicles for making independent expenditures. Super PACs
are, in fact, advantageous for these very reasons, but unlike Super
PACs, 501(c)(4) organizations are generally not required to disclose
the identity of their donors.55 This anonymity is what has made
501(c)(4)s a popular vehicle for independent expenditures in recent

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

SCHADLER, supra note 10, at 11.

Id. at 3.
Id.
26 U.S.C. § 501 (2010).
26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(4)-1 (2013).
Id.
Id.
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876.
26 U.S.C. § 501 (2010).
Id.
26 U.S.C. § 527 ( 2003).
26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(4)-1 (2013).
SCHADLER, supra note 10, at 3.
26 U.S.C. § 527 (2003).
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elections.
Under IRC 527(f), a 501(c)(4) may be taxed at the maximum
corporate tax rate on the lesser of its investment income and its
expenditures for political activities.16 501(c)(4)s with significant
investment income are, therefore, dissuaded from making
independent expenditures. In contrast, a 501(c)(4) with little to no
investment income faces a much less daunting potential tax liability.
The reason 527(f) uses the amount of investment income as the
metric for determining tax liability is that 501(c)(4)s are not taxed on
their investment income. 527(f) thus prevents 501(c)(4)s from
spending untaxed investment income on independent expenditures.
A 501(c)(4) is further limited in its spending flexibility by the
requirement that at least 50 of its expenditures must be toward its
primary purpose.57 A 501(c)(4)'s independent expenditures count as
spending not for its primary purpose.18 If an organization exceeds the
50 limit, it will not qualify as a 501(c)(4).5 1 This test serves to place a
hard cap on the upper limit of 501(c)(4) independent expenditures.
B.

SUPER PACS

A Super PAC is a special type of federal political action
committee ("PAC") that can only make independent expenditures
and must publicly disclose donors.6o Super PACs are also known as
Independent Expenditure Only PACs, primarily to distinguish them
from traditional federal PACs. Super PACs differ from traditional
federal PACs in that they may receive unlimited contributions but
may only make independent expenditures. 61 Traditional federal
PACs, on the other hand, have significant limitations on their
fundraising, but may make contributions directly to candidates or to
other PACs.62 Traditional Federal PACs have a $5,000 cap per
individual donor and cannot receive contributions from either
corporations or unions. 63 Super PACs and Federal PACs can actually
56. SCHADLER, supra note 10, at 3; See also Ellen P. Aprill, Once and Future Gift Taxation
of Transfers to Section 501(c) (4) Organizations:Current Law, Constitutional Issues, and Policy
Considerations, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 289, 302 (2012).
57. 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(4)-1 (2013).
58. SCHADLER, supra note 10, at 13; see also Aprill, supra note 56, at 302.
59. SCHADLER, supra note 10, at 50.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 64.

63. Id. at 72.
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be a single PAC if their funds and activities are kept separate. 6
Federal PACs are explicitly exempted from the gift tax.6 5
A 501(c)(4) may generally associate with a federal PAC and treat
the PAC as a separate segregated fund ("SSF"), but the ability for a
super PAC to associate as a SSF has yet to be determined. 66 A
501(c)(4) with a PAC as a SSF is able to pay for the costs of
establishing, administering, and fundraising for the PAC, but must
otherwise keep the two funds separate.67 These costs are not subject
to the 527(f) tax, but are counted as spending not for the 501(c)(4)'s
primary purpose6 A 501(c)(4) may only solicit contributions to a
PAC as SSF from its restricted class. 69 A corporation's restricted class
consists of bona fide members, executive and administrative
personnel, and their families. 70
The FEC has approved an alternative method for a 501(c)(4) to
establish a Super PAC.71 A 501(c)(4) may establish a Super PAC as a
nonconnected PAC.7 2 Similar to forming a PAC as a SSF, a
nonconnected Super PAC may share officers, office space, and staff
with the organizing 501(c)(4).7 1 The primary advantage of forming a
nonconnected PAC, rather than an SSF, is that the nonconnected
PAC is able to solicit contributions from the general public, labor
unions, and other federally-permissible sources. 74 The main drawback
to establishing a nonconnected Super PAC is that the FEC has not
yet made clear whether a 501(c)(4) is liable under 527(f) if it pays the
costs of establishing, administering, and fundraising for the
nonconnected Super PAC."
A 501(c)(4) benefits from establishing a nonconnected Super
PAC because the Super PAC may make unlimited independent
expenditures. 76 A 501(c)(4) alone would be limited by the "primary
purpose" test77 and may also be taxed on the independent
64. 26 U.S.C. § 2501 (2012).
65. SCHADLER, supra note 10, at 73.
66. Id. at 50.
67. Id. at 73.
68. Id. at 50.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 73; See also Federal Election Commission, Advisory Opinion 2010-09 (July 22,2010),
available at http://saos.nictusa.com/aodocs/AO202010-09.pdf [hereinafter FEC, AO 2010-091.
71. SCHADLER, supra note 10, at 73; FEC, AO 2010-09, supra note 70.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. SCHADLER, supra note 10, at 74.
76. Id. at 13; see also Aprill, supra note 56.
77. 26 U.S.C. § 527 (2003).
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expenditures it did make.18 An existing 501(c)(4) that wishes to make
independent expenditures can limit tax liabilities by establishing a
nonconnected Super PAC. The 501(c)(4) with investment income
will not be taxed under 527(f) unless it makes independent
expenditures and the nonconnected Super PAC will not be taxed for
making independent expenditures.
While a 501(c)(4) organization that only engages in lobbying
forming a nonconnected Super PAC that only makes independent
expenditures results in the most favorable tax treatment, it is not
necessarily the ideal solution when some of the donors wish to remain
anonymous. The FEC requires Super PACs to disclose all of their
donors. 79 501(c)(4)s, on the other hand, are only required to disclose
their donors in rare circumstances.80
Donors who wish to remain anonymous, but still prefer their
donations to be used on independent expenditures, are able to do so
by donating to the 501(c)(4) instead of the Super PAC. The 501(c)(4)
can then either use the money to make independent expenditures on
its own or to give the money to the nonconnected Super PAC (or
another organization) to be used for independent expenditures. In
either situation, the spending is political in nature and therefore may
be subject to taxation under 527(f). Even if the 501(c)(4) is willing to
pay the 527(f) tax, the spending would still qualify as spending not for
the 501(c)(4)'s primary purpose.
C. LLC
A limited liability company ("LLC") is a relatively new form of
business entity that combines elements of both corporations and
partnerships. An LLC is not taxed at the entity level, like a
subchapter C corporation; rather, the income passes through to the
LLC's members in accordance with the LLC's operating agreement.
The members are then taxed at according to their individual tax
brackets. The large variation in state law regarding disclosure of LLC
members makes them attractive options for anonymous political
contributions. In states where public disclosure of the members of an
78. SCHADLER, supra note 10, at 50.
79. SCHADLER, supra note 10, at 3; see also Emma Schwarz, The Rules That Govern
501(c)(4)s, PBS.ORG (Oct. 30, 2012), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/
government-elections-politics/big-sky-big-money/the-rules-that-govern-501c4s/.
80. Some states, such as Arizona, also allow LLCs to list only a trust if that trust is a part
owner of the LLC. See Richard Keyt, The Confidential LLC, http://www.keytlaw.com/
azllclawlforming-llcs/confidential-llc/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2013).
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LLC is not mandated, LLCs may be used to make anonymous
political contributions to Super PACs."'
Creating and maintaining an LLC is not as convenient as writing a
check to a 501(c)(4) organization, but LLCs do offer some advantages
over 501(c)(4)s. LLCs are especially attractive for large donors, since
the cost of creating and maintaining a LLC is relatively low.8 2 LLCs are
also able to donate the entirety of a contribution to a Super PAC,
which may then spend it on independent expenditures. Because
501(c)(4)s are limited to spending fifty percent or less of their funds on
political expenditures and the other fifty percent mostly goes towards
lobbying for the 501(c)(4)'s primary purpose, donors who would prefer
their money to be spent solely on independent expenditures would
benefit even more from using a LLC.
The use of an LLC as a vehicle for obfuscating the source of
donations received press coverage during the 2012 election.83 These
donations primarily took one of two forms. The first involved
individuals skirting campaign contribution limits by making the
maximum contribution allowed for an individual while making
subsequent contributions in the name of LLCs owned by the
individual." The second method consisted of making contributions to
Super PACs through LLCs that were not easily traceable to the
individual actually making the contribution.15
IV. GIFT TAX AND 501(C)(4) CONTRIBUTIONS
The primary purpose of the gift tax is to prevent decedents from
transferring their assets prior to death in an attempt to avoid the

81. See LEGALZOOM, http://www.legalzoom.comllc-faq/lc-operating-costs.html
(last
visited Mar. 16, 2013).
82. Chris Cillizza, Why Mitt's mystery donor doesn't (really) matter, WASH. POST (Aug. 5,
2011),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/post/why-mitts-mystcry-donor-doesntreally-mattcr/08/ 05/gIQAzsolwl_blog.html; Michael Luo, Mystery Donors Dot Restore Our
Future's Campaign Filing,N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2012), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/
10/19/mystery-donors-dot-restore-our-futures-campaign-filing/; Nicholas Confessore and Michael
Luo, Secrecy Shrouds 'Super PAC' Fundy in Latest Filings, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2012), http://www.
nytimes.com/2012/02/02/us/politics/super-pac-filings-show-power-and-secrecy.html?pagewanted=all.
83. Colbert I. King, In D.C., a mockery of campaign finance laws, WASH. POST (Jan. 13,
2012),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/how-dc-interests-sidestep-campaign-financelimits/2012/01/ 13/giQAzcl BxP story.htmI.
84. Michael Luo, Mystery Donors Dot Restore Our Future's Campaign Filing, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 19, 2012), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/19/mystery-donors-dot-restore-ourfutures-campaign-filing/.
85. Dickmin v. C.I.R., 465 U.S. 330, 338 (1984).
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estate tax.86 The gift tax also serves to discourage taxpayers from
transferring income producing property to family members in lower
income brackets to decrease tax liability." The gift tax has existed in
some form since 1924, with a six-year gap from 1926 to 1932.8 The
gift tax is payable by the donor. 9 It applies to all inter vivos transfers
of property not made in the course of business that are made for less
than fair market value. 0 Donative intent is not required, but it is a
factor.91 Donative intent may also affect whether the donee must
claim the transfer as income. 2 Transfers of property from individual
donors to organizations that are not made in the course of business
are generally considered gifts, but transfers to certain organizations
are exempt from the gift tax.
Relatively few taxpayers ever pay gift or estate tax due to the
exclusions and credits in place. The IRC provides both an annual perdonee exclusion and a unified credit against gift tax. Section 2503
provides a $14,000 per donee per year exception for inter vivos gifts. 93
A married couple may give $28,000 to each donee. 94 Only donations
exceeding this amount serve to reduce the unified credit against gift
tax.9 5 Any gifts exceeding the yearly limit serve to reduce the unified
credit against gift tax by the excessive amount.96 The unified credits
against gift tax and estate tax are each currently $5.25 million for an
individual taxpayer. 7 However, the two credits are essentially one
since reductions in the unified credit against gift tax results in a
reduction of the unified credit against estate tax. 8 Because reductions
in the unified credit against gift tax result in corresponding reductions
in the unified credit against estate tax, a taxpayer who will have an
estate near or exceeding the credit amount will incur future estate tax
liability with any reduction in the unified credit against gift tax.
The gift and estate taxes are very similar and are both found in

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Aprill, supra note 56, at 294; see also Dickmin, 465 U.S. at 338.
Aprill, supra note 56, at 294.
26 U.S.C. § 2502 (2011).
Dickmin, 465 U.S. at 335.
26 C.F.R. § 25.2512-8 (2013).
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 284-85 (1960).
26 U.S.C. § 2503 (1998).
26 U.S.C. § 2503 (1998).
Id.
26 U.S.C. § 2505 (2011).
Id. at § 2010.
Id.
26 U.S.C. § 2001 (2010).
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section 2001,9 although the highest brackets have been adjusted by
the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012.11m The maximum tax rate
under the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 is forty percent.0 1
The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001
("EGTRRA"), reduced the maximum rate from fifty-five percent to
an amount fluctuating between thirty-nine percent and forty-nine
percent." 2 The EGTRRA changes were set to expire in 2011, but
Congress passed the Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance
Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010, which provided a
temporary rate that was to expire in 2012.103 Congress then passed the
American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, which established forty
percent as the maximum rate.t1
While contributions to 501(c)(3) organizations'0o and 527 political
organizations (including Super PACs) are expressly exempt from gift
tax liability,106 contributions to 501(c)(4)s have not been expressly
exempted from gift tax liability. Section 2522 provides an offsetting
deduction for charitable gifts to charitable organizations not
0
disqualified under 501(c)(3).o'
Section 2501 provides an exception
for contributions to political organizations which are defined in
527(e)(1).108

There is little authority answering the question of whether
contributions 501(c)(4) organizations are taxable gifts has minimal
authority, but the existing authority supports the taxability of such
contributions.109 In Revenue Ruling 82-216, the IRS stated that
transfers to organizations other than 527(e) political organizations are
"subject to the gift tax absent any specific statute to the contrary
.
"10
1..
Between issuing this ruling in 1982 and 2011, when it stated it
would take no action until it received further guidance, the IRS took
no action on the topic .11
99. American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240,106 Stat. 2313.
100. Id.
101. Rhomberg, supra note 38, at 63.
102. Id.
103. American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240,106 Stat. 2313.
104. 26 U.S.C. § 2522 (2012).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at § 2501.
108. Rhomberg, supra note 38, at 65-66.
109. Id. at 66; Rev. Rul. 82-216, 1983-50 I.R.B. 12.
110. Aprill, supra note 56; IRS.gov, IRS statement on applicability of gift tax on 501(c)(4)
organization contributions (Aug. 4, 2012), available at http://www.irs.gov/uac/IRS-statement-onapplicability-of-gift-tax-on-50128c2928429-organization-contributions.
111. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876; see also SpeechNow.org, 599 F.3d 686.
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V. EFFECT OF THE 501(C)(4) GIFT TAX ON ANONYMOUS
POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS
When considering whether the gift tax would be a proper means
of curbing anonymous political contributions, it is necessary to
determine if it would even be effective. If Congress chooses to apply
the gift tax to 501(c)(4) contributions, individuals will most likely
respond by making fewer and smaller contributions. The rationale
for this assumption is that individuals will contribute money with the
goal of maximizing its impact. Individuals may still contribute to a
particular 501(c)(4), but they would be less likely to contribute
amounts larger than the yearly gift tax exclusion amount in order to
avoid gift tax liability. Individuals who do choose to make
contributions exceeding the yearly limit have to factor in the cost of
the gift tax when deciding how much to contribute. For example, an
individual who wishes to contribute $100,000 after-tax dollars to a
particular 501(c)(4) would contribute $71430 in anticipation of the 40
percent tax. Many individuals may also stop contributing to
501(c)(4)s altogether. The largest contributors will be the most likely
to stop contributing altogether because they would both save the
most money and have the means to more easily make anonymous
contributions using alternative methods.
The gift tax would almost certainly cause contributions to
501(c)(4)s to decrease, but it would be unlikely to have a large impact
on anonymous political contributions as a whole. Because only
individuals contributing over $14,000 to any single 501(c)(4) would be
impacted, only the largest donors would even face taxation if the gift
tax was applied to 501(c)(4) contributions. It is precisely these donors
who are in the best position to take advantage of alternative methods
of making anonymous contributions. When faced with a forty
percent tax on 501(c)(4) contributions exceeding the yearly gift limit,
either creating an LLC solely for the purpose of handling political
contributions or using an existing LLC would easily become more
economical than contributing to 501(c)(4)s and paying the gift tax.
The impact of applying the gift tax would be further diluted if
501(c)(4) organizations became smaller but greater in number. There
is no limit on the number of 501(c)(4)s with similar goals that may
exist. Individuals could, therefore, simply donate the yearly limit to
an unlimited number of 501(c)(4)s with similar goals. These
contributions could very easily find their way to the same place they
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would have otherwise with little overall impact on the aggregate
anonymous political contributions.
There are some drawbacks to creating a number of smaller
501(c)(4)s. Each new 501(c)(4) would require additional administrative
costs. Individuals would also be required to make a slightly greater
effort when determining to which 501(c)(4)s they wish to contribute.
This option is also much easier for the person making the
contributions; instead of having to form an LLC the person making
the contributions is only required to write a few more checks.
Ultimately, it is not important which method is used, but it is clear
that the gift tax will do little to hamper anonymous political
contributions.
It is very unlikely that the costs of either forming additional
501(c)(4)s or forming LLCs would exceed the gift tax paid by large
donors but that does not necessarily mean anonymous political
contributions would not decrease. Either solution is decidedly more
difficult than writing a single check to a single 501(c)(4). This
increased complexity would most likely result in at least some
decrease in the overall amount of anonymous political contributions.
VI. LEGAL AND POLICY ARGUMENTS
Because the IRS has chosen not to pursue applying the gift tax to
501(c)(4) contributions without further guidance, the decision will most
likely fall to Congress. In deciding whether to introduce legislation,
Congress must determine whether the tax would be favorable for
public policy, whether it would be consistent with current law, and
whether it would be likely to survive a constitutional challenge.
A.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND CONSTITUTIONALITY

A more fundamental question than what effect the gift tax would
have on anonymous political speech is whether the government
should allow any form of anonymous political speech. Courts have
consistently ruled that mandating disclosure of donors to political
organizations is constitutional." 2
In SpeechNow.org, the court
referenced the decision in Buckley and explained that permitting
mandatory disclosure is, "based on a governmental interest in
'provid[ing] the electorate with information' about the sources of
112. SpeechNow.org, 599 F.3d at 696.
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political campaign funds, not just the interest in deterring corruption
and enforcing anti-corruption measures.'ll3 Because 501(c)(4)s are
able to participate in a significant amount of political speech via
independent expenditures, it makes little sense that they should avoid
the disclosure requirements imposed on Super PACs. A 501(c)(4)
could make the exact same independent expenditure as a Super PAC
or even contribute money to the Super PAC. It follows that the
electorate has an equal interest in the sources of either expenditure.
The argument against mandatory disclosure centers around the
First Amendment's mandate that "Congress shall make no law ...
abridging the freedom of speech."114 Therefore, the pertinent
question is what qualifies as an abridgement of freedom of speech. In
Citizens United the Supreme Court held that the government has no
anticorruption interest in limiting independent expenditures.'15
However, in SpeechNow.org, the court did not find that FECA
disclosure requirements alone violated the First Amendment.116
The application of the gift tax to 501(c)(4) contributions raises a
First Amendment issue similar to but distinct from the one posed in
Citizens United."' In Citizens United the Court held that restricting

the ability of organizations to make independent expenditures
violated the First Amendment."' The gift tax would not directly
place limits on 501(c)(4) independent expenditures, but would reduce
The
the funding available for the independent expenditures.
pertinent distinction is that the gift tax would affect independent
expenditures incidentally rather than targeting them directly.
Taking a brief look at the past treatment of similar taxes is useful
to determine whether the Supreme Court is likely to uphold the
constitutionality of extending the gift tax. The Supreme Court has
regularly upheld broad based taxes in the face of First Amendment
scrutiny." 9 In Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization,

the Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the taxation
of religious materials violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment because California's Sales and Use tax was not targeted
specifically at the religious material, but rather applied generally to
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
(1989).

U.S. CONsT. amend. 1.
See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 884.
SpeechNow.org, 599 F. 3d at 698.
Aprill, supra note 56, at 311; Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876.
See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876.
Aprill, supra note 56, at 315.
Id.; see also Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 110 S. Ct. 688
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all sales. 12 0 In Regan v. Taxation With Representation ("TWR"), the
Supreme Court held not only that "statutory classifications are
generally 'valid if they bear a rational relation to a legitimate
governmental purpose,' but also that legislatures are given particular
discretion in creating tax classifications." 2 1 In Leathers the court
relied on the TWR decision and extended the TWR analysis to sales
tax. 122 Each Court refused to apply a heightened level of scrutiny. 12 3
Similar to the aforementioned Supreme Court cases, the gift tax
is also broad based. The gift tax is broad based because it would
apply to all 501(c)(4) organizations, regardless of whether they make
independent expenditures. The TWR Court's statement regarding
Congress's discretion in creating tax classifications is further evidence
that the constitutionality of the tax would be upheld. The Leathers
Court's extension of the TWR analysis to sales tax increases the
likelihood that the TWR analysis would also be used for the gift tax. 124
B.

PUBLIC POLICY

The fundamental policy question is whether it is appropriate to
use the gift tax as a means to curb anonymous political contributions
via 501(c)(4)s. This question has two distinct parts: (1) Should we
curb anonymous political contributions; and (2) is the gift tax a
reasonable means to that end?
The court in Buckley described the policy issue raised by
anonymous political speech as a compromise of the countervailing
governmental interests of upholding free speech and informing the
electorate.125 Extending the logic of the Buckley decision, the policy
question becomes whether anonymous political contributions are
consistent with democracy in the U.S.
As Thomas Jefferson noted, a well informed electorate is a
fundamental requirement of any democracy. 2 6
A democratic
government requires citizens to vote for their preferred candidate.
Citizens must necessarily have information about whom they are
120. Aprill, supra note 56, at 318 (quoting Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash.,
461 U.S. 540 (1997)).
121. Aprill, supra note 56, at 317; see also Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 451 (1991).
122. Aprill, supra note 56, at 316-17.
123. Id. at 317.
124. Buckley, 424 U.S. 1.
125. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Richard Price (Jan. 8, 1789), in The Library of
Congress Exhibitions, available at http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/jefferson/60.htmI.
126. Aprill, supra note 56, at 321.
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voting or all meaning is removed from casting the ballot. It follows
that the U.S. government should do as much as possible to encourage
its citizens to remain well informed.
A citizen must know the source of information in order to
determine whether or not to believe the information. For example, a
study showing evidence of decreased crime in a place where it is legal
to carry concealed weapons will be significantly more persuasive
coming from an independent organization than a pro-gun
organization. Similarly, advertisements about candidates would be
viewed differently if the organization funding the advertisement were
clearly partisan in nature.
Next, the question turns to whether the gift tax is the right tool for
limiting anonymous contributions. The Internal Revenue Code
already influences taxpayer behavior through tax incentives. It might,
therefore, seem logical to use the gift tax to discourage anonymous
political spending. However, applying the gift tax to 501(c)(4)
contributions does not affect anonymous political speech directly, but
rather discourages it. Furthermore, applying the gift tax to 501(c)(4)
contributions is inconsistent when the tax is not applied to
501(c)(4)
contributions to 501(c)(3) or 527 organizations.
127
organizations.
527
and
501(c)(3)
both
organizations share qualities of
501(c)(4) organizations provide social welfare benefits similar to
501(c)(3) organizations and may engage in political activities similar
to 527 organizations.128 If Congress chose to modify existing law with
the intent of curbing anonymous political speech, it would be
tantamount to punishing all 501(c)(4) organizations for the actions of
the few that abuse this ability. This is especially illogical considering
that Congress could just as easily require disclosure for 501(c)(4)
organizations thus stopping the undesirable action without causing
collateral harm.
If the gift tax is applied to all 501(c)(4) contributions, it will place
a large and unintended burden on both social welfare lobbying in the
Previous articles
U.S. and 501(c)(4) organizations generally.
addressing the negative impact of the gift tax on 501(c)(4)
organizations have correctly presented ballot committees as an
example of a legitimate and desirable organization that would be
significantly harmed by the gift tax.1 29 Ballot committees are normally
127. Id. at 322.

128. Aprill, supra note 56, at 321; Rhomberg, supra note 38, at 65.
129. Aprill, supra note 56, at 322.
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501(c)(4) organizations because their primary activity involves getting
measures included on ballots.3 0
This activity is considered
influencing legislation and therefore disqualifies these organizations
from 501(c)(3) status.131
If Congress chooses to introduce legislation that applies the gift
tax to all 501(c)(4) contributions, 501(c)(4) organizations that do not
make independent expenditures will be unnecessarily burdened. It
would be more fair to only apply the gift tax to the same percentage
of each contribution as the percentage a 501(c)(4) spends on political
expenditures but this would undoubtedly raise questions of
constitutionality. 2
The best solution would be to require all
organizations that make independent expenditures to list the source
of the money.
VII. CONCLUSION
Applying the gift tax to 501(c)(4) contributions initially appears
to pose a threat to anonymous political contributions. However, once
the already large exemptions and simple workarounds are taken into
consideration, it becomes clear that the gift tax would, at most, be an
inconvenience. Before Congress concerns itself with taxing 501(c)(4)
contributions, a more candid assessment regarding anonymous
political speech is in order. The two most glaring loopholes (i.e.
501(c)(4)s and LLCs) could be easily fixed if Congress instead
introduced legislation requiring all organizations that make political
expenditures to disclose the identities of their contributors.
Requiring disclosure is a preferable method to applying the gift
tax for a number of reasons. Instead of attempting to influence
donors, it closes the hole entirely. Other organizations that make
independent expenditures are already required to disclose their
donors and the constitutionality of these requirements has been
consistently upheld. Requiring disclosure has the added benefit of
not punishing 501(c)(4) organizations that do not engage in political
activities.
Furthermore, applying the gift tax to 501(c)(4)
130. Id.; 26 U.S.C. § 501 (2010).
131. See discussion supra Part VI.A.
132. The IRS has recently proposed new, stricter, guidelines for qualifying as a 501(c)(4). If
these rules are codified 501 (c)(4) may very well fall from favor but the fundamental criticisms of
allowing any anonymous political contributions remain; see Guidance for Tax-Exempt Social
Welfare Organizations on Candidate-Related Political Activities, 78 Fed. Reg. 71535 (Nov. 29,
2013), available at https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2013/11/29/2013-28492/guidance-fortax-exempt-social-welfare-organizations-on-candidate-related-political-activitis#h-14
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contributions does nothing to prevent individuals from making
anonymous contributions through LLCs. It is possible the IRS will
receive the guidance it desires, but the motivation for this guidance
should not be a desire to influence political activities by 501(c)(4)s.
By introducing legislation requiring organizations that make political
expenditures to disclose the identities of their contributors, Congress
will return 501(c)(4)s to lobbying organizations and funnel political
contributions to Super PACs where they belong.

